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Since 1984, various optical quantum key distribution (QKD) protocols have been proposed and
examined. In all of them, the rate of secret key generation decays exponentially with distance. A
natural and fundamental question is then whether there are yet-to-be discovered optical QKD pro-
tocols (without quantum repeaters) that could circumvent this rate-distance tradeoff. This paper
provides a major step towards answering this question. We show that the secret-key-agreement
capacity of a lossy and noisy optical channel assisted by unlimited two-way public classical commu-
nication is limited by an upper bound that is solely a function of the channel loss, regardless of how
much optical power the protocol may use. Our result has major implications for understanding the
secret-key-agreement capacity of optical channels—a long-standing open problem in optical quan-
tum information theory—and strongly suggests a real need for quantum repeaters to perform QKD
at high rates over long distances.
The goal of quantum key distribution (QKD) is to gen-
erate a shared secret key between two distant parties Al-
ice and Bob, such that the key is perfectly secret from
any eavesdropper, Eve. Since the invention of the BB84
protocol [1], the theory and practice of QKD has come
a long way. Various different QKD protocols have been
proposed in the last three decades [5], some of which are
now turning from science into practical technologies [3–
5]. Security of QKD has now been proven for many pro-
tocols and under practical limitations such as a finite key
length [6, 7].
It is well recognized that the key rates of all known
QKD protocols (such as BB84 [1], E91 [8], CV-GG02 [9])
decay exponentially with distance. To obtain a large
key rate across a long distance link, the link can be di-
vided into many low-loss segments separated by trusted
(physically-secured) relay nodes. Interestingly however,
quantum mechanics permits building QKD protocols us-
ing devices called quantum repeaters, which if supplied
at the relay nodes, would make it unnecessary to physi-
cally secure them, thus enabling long-distance high-rate
QKD.
Quantum repeater technology, in particular ones built
using quantum memories, have been a subject of intense
investigation in recent years [10, 11], but an operational
demonstration of a quantum repeater has proven ex-
tremely challenging and has yet to be conducted (note
that some repeater protocols without quantum memory
have been proposed recently [12, 13], but their implemen-
tation is still challenging).
The natural question that thus arises, is whether there
are yet-to-be-discovered optical QKD protocols that
could circumvent the exponential rate-distance tradeoff
of BB84 and transmit at high rates over long distances
without the need for quantum repeaters. In this paper,
we establish that it is not possible to do so. We employ
information-theoretic techniques in order to establish our
main result.
The secret key agreement capacity of a quantum chan-
nel is the highest rate (bits per channel use) at which a
shared key can be reliably and securely generated using
the channel many times in conjunction with unlimited
two-way classical communication over an authenticated
public channel. This paper establishes that, regardless of
the QKD protocol used, a fundamental limit on the se-
cret key agreement capacity of a lossy optical channel is
given by an upper bound that is solely a function of the
channel loss, i.e., independent of the transmit power. We
show that the bound is nearly optimal at high loss, the
regime relevant for practical QKD. We also compare our
upper bound and the best-known achievable rate with
the ideal BB84 and CV-GG02 protocols. We find that
even though there is room for improvement over these
protocols, there is essentially no gap in the rate-loss scal-
ing. We thereby place on a firm foundation the need
for quantum repeaters for high rate QKD over long dis-
tances with no trusted relays. We note that the upper
bound proved here is a so-called ‘weak converse’ upper
bound, meaning that if the communication rate of any
secret key agreement protocol exceeds this bound, then
our theorem implies that its reliability and security can
never be perfect, even in the asymptotic limit of many
channel uses (we will also discuss the issue of a finite
number of channel uses below and the Methods section).
A generic point-to-point QKD protocol is illustrated in
Fig. 1. In the protocol, the sender Alice transmits over
n independent uses of the quantum channel N . The le-
gitimate receiver Bob obtains the outputs of the channel
uses. Note that Alice could send product or entangled
states. They are also allowed unlimited two-way public
classical communication over an authenticated channel,
in order to generate shared secret key. The adversary
Eve is assumed to be ‘all-powerful’: one who has ac-
cess to the full environment of the Alice-to-Bob quan-
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2tum channel, the ‘maximal’ quantum system to which
she can have access. Optically, this translates to Eve
being able to collect every single photon that does not
enter Bob’s receiver. Eve may also actively attack, for
instance by injecting a quantum state into the channel.
She has access to all the public classical communication
between Alice and Bob. Finally, Eve is assumed to be
able to store the quantum states she obtains over all n
channel uses without any loss or degradation, and she
can make any collective quantum measurement on those
systems, in an attempt to learn the secret key. In the
theory of QKD, one attributes all channel impairments
(such as loss, noise, turbulence, detector imperfections)
collectively measured by Alice and Bob during a channel-
estimation step of the protocol, to adversarial actions of
the worst case Eve with which the measured channel is
‘consistent’ (even though in reality all those impairments
may have been caused by non-adversarial natural phe-
nomena). Alice and Bob then run a key generation pro-
tocol aiming to generate secret key at a rate close to the
secret key agreement capacity of that channel. It is hard
in general to calculate this capacity precisely, and even
more so to come up with protocols that can attain key
rates close to that capacity.
In this paper, we show a strong limitation on the secret
key agreement capacity of a general memoryless quan-
tum channel. More precisely, we provide a simple upper
bound on the two-way assisted private capacity P2(N ) of
a quantum channel N . Note that the capacity for secret-
key agreement using QKD as discussed above is equal to
the capacity for private communication with unlimited
public discussion, due to the one-time pad protocol. We
first define a new quantity, the squashed entanglement
of a quantum channel, and show that it is a simple up-
per bound on P2(N ) for any quantum channel N . We
then apply it to the pure-loss optical channel Nη with
transmittance η ∈ [0, 1]. Channel loss is an important
and measurable impairment both for free-space and fiber
optical links, and is directly tied to the communication
distance (for example, a low-loss fiber may have a loss of
0.2 dBkm−1). Since any excess noise in the channel or
detectors can only reduce the extractable key rate, our
upper bound on P2(Nη) imposes a fundamental upper
limit on the secret key rate of any point-to-point QKD
protocol over a lossy optical channel not assisted by any
quantum repeater. We will establish the following upper
bound:
P2(Nη) ≤ log2((1 + η)/(1− η)) key bits per mode. (1)
In the practical regime of high loss (η  1), we will
argue that this upper bound is only a factor of two
higher than the best known lower bound, P2(Nη) ≥
log(1/(1− η)) [14]. We will also extend our upper bound
to the more general scenario of QKD using a two-way
quantum channel with unlimited public discussion, which
was discussed recently in Ref. [15]. Finally, we will com-
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FIG. 1: A generic point-to-point QKD protocol. Al-
ice transmits quantum state via n forward uses of a quantum
channel to Bob. They are also allowed to use unlimited for-
ward and backward public classical communication over an
authenticated classical channel.
pare our upper bound and the best-known lower bound
to the rate achievable by the BB84 and the CV-GG02
protocols under best-case operating conditions as well as
compare to the performance of these protocols under re-
alistic operating conditions.
Results
Squashed entanglement. Before discussing our
main results, we briefly review the squashed entangle-
ment, which plays an important role in our work. The
secret-key agreement capacity assisted by public com-
munication was defined for a classical channel pY,Z|X
(X = Alice, Y = Bob, Z = Eve), independently by Mau-
rer [16], and Ahlswede and Csisza´r [17], who proved lower
and upper bounds on the capacity. Maurer and Wolf
later introduced the intrinsic information I(X;Y ↓Z) ≡
min
{
I(X;Y |Z ′) : PX,Y,Z,Z′ = PX,Y,ZPZ′|Z
}
, and proved
that this quantity optimized over all channel input distri-
butions is a sharp upper bound on the secret key agree-
ment capacity of pY,Z|X [18]. Leveraging strong par-
allels discovered between secrecy and quantum coher-
ence [19–21], Christandl and Winter extended the in-
trinsic information quantity to the realm of quantum
information theory. They defined the squashed entan-
glement Esq(A;B)ρ of a bipartite quantum state ρAB ,
and proved it to be an upper bound on the rate at which
two parties can distill maximally entangled (Bell) states
(|0〉|0〉+ |1〉|1〉)/√2 from many copies of ρAB using lo-
cal operations and classical communication (LOCC) [2].
Using a similar technique, the squashed entanglement
was proved to upper bound the distillable secret key
rate [23, 24]. The squashed entanglement of a bipartite
3state ρAB is defined as
Esq(A;B)ρ ≡ 12 infSE→E′ I(A;B|E
′), (2)
where I(A;B|E′) ≡ H(AE′) + H(BE′) − H(E′) −
H(ABE′) is the conditional quantum mutual informa-
tion and the infimum is taken over all noisy ‘squashing
channels’ SE→E′ taking the E system of a purification
|φρ〉ABE of ρAB to a system E′ of arbitrary dimension. In
related work, Tucci has defined a functional bearing some
similarities to squashed entanglement [25, 26]. We can
interpret Esq(A;B)ρ as quantifying the minimum rem-
nant quantum correlations between A and B after an
adversary possessing the purifying system E performs a
quantum operation on it with the intent of ‘squashing
down’ the correlations that A and B share. It should
also be noted that among the many entanglement mea-
sures, squashed entanglement is the only one known to
satisfy all eight desirable properties that have arisen in
the axiomatization of entanglement theory [2, 27–29].
Squashed entanglement of a quantum channel.
The upper bound from [23] on the distillable key rate ap-
plies to the scenario in which Alice and Bob share many
copies of some bipartite state ρAB . In order to upper
bound the key agreement capacity of a channel, we define
the squashed entanglement of a quantum channel NA′→B
as the maximum squashed entanglement that can be reg-
istered between a sender and receiver with access to the
input A′ and output B of this channel, respectively:
Esq(N ) ≡ max|φ〉AA′
Esq(A;B)ρ, (3)
where ρ ≡ ρAB ≡ NA′→B(|φ〉〈φ|AA′). Note that, in the
above formula, we can take a maximum rather than a
supremum if the input space is finite-dimensional because
in this case, the input space is compact and the squashed
entanglement measure is continuous [28]. Also, we can
restrict the optimization to be taken over pure bipartite
states, due to the convexity of squashed entanglement
[2].
We now prove that Esq(N ) plays an operational role
analogous to intrinsic information, i.e., it upper bounds
the secret-key agreement capacity P2(N ).
Theorem 1: Esq(N ) is an upper bound on P2(N ), the
private capacity of N assisted by unlimited forward and
backward classical communication:
P2(N ) ≤ Esq(N ). (4)
Proof: First recall that the squashed entanglement is a
secrecy monotone, that is, it does not increase under local
operations and public classical communication (LOPC)
in the sense that Esq(A;B)ρ ≥ Esq(A;B)σ if Alice and
Bob can obtain the state σAB from ρAB by LOPC [23,
24]. The method for doing so was to exploit the fact that
LOPC distillation of secret key is equivalent to LOCC
distillation of private states [30, 31]. A private state has
the following form [30, 31]:
γABA′B′ = UABA′B′(|Φ〉〈Φ|AB ⊗ ρA′B′)U†ABA′B′ ,
where UABA′B′ =
∑
i,j |i〉〈i|A⊗|j〉〈j|B⊗U ijA′B′ is a global
unitary operation, |Φ〉AB =
∑
i |i〉A|i〉B/
√
d is a max-
imally entangled state of Schmidt rank d, and {|i〉A}
and {|i〉B} are complete orthonormal bases for quan-
tum systems A and B, respectively. Furthermore, the
squashed entanglement is normalized, in the sense that
Esq(A;B)γ ≥ log d (see Proposition 4.19 of [24]). Fi-
nally, the squashed entanglement satisfies the following
continuity inequality [24, 28]:
if ‖ρAB − σAB‖1 ≤ ε, then∣∣∣Esq(A;B)ρ − Esq(A;B)σ∣∣∣ ≤ 16√ε log d′ + 4h2(2√ε),
(5)
where d′ = min{|A|, |B|} and h2(x) is the binary entropy
function with the property that limx→0 h2(x) = 0.
The most general (n,R, ε) protocol in this setting is
described as follows, where n is the number of channel
uses, R is the key generation rate (measured in secret
key bits per channel use), and ε is a parameter quan-
tifying the security (see below for their formal defini-
tions). The protocol begins with Alice preparing a state
ρ
(1)
AA1···An on n+1 systems. She then transmits the system
A1 through one use of the channel N , and considering
its isometric extension UNA1→B1E1 , we write the output
state as σ
(1)
AB1E1A2···An . Let R
(1) be a system that pu-
rifies this state. There is then a round of an arbitrary
amount of LOPC between Alice and Bob, resulting in a
state ρ
(2)
AB1E1A2···An . This procedure continues, with Al-
ice transmitting system A2 through the channel, leading
to a state σ
(2)
AB1E1B2E2A3···An , etc. After the nth chan-
nel use, the state is σ
(n)
AB1E1B2E2···BnEn (note that the
dimension of the system A might change throughout the
protocol). Let R(n) be a reference system that purifies
this state. There is a final round of LOPC, producing a
state ωABE1···En , whose reduction ωAB satisfies
‖ωAB − γAB‖1 ≤ ε,
where γAB is a private state of nR bits. Note that we
are implicitly including the systems A′ and B′ in A and
B, respectively.
We can now proceed by bounding the secret key gen-
eration rate of any such protocol as follows:
nR ≤ Esq(A;B)γ
≤ Esq(A;B)ω + nf(ε).
The first inequality follows from the normalization of the
squashed entanglement on private states (as mentioned
4above). The second inequality follows from the continu-
ity of squashed entanglement, with an appropriate choice
of f(ε) so that limε→0 f(ε) = 0 (see the Methods section
for more details). To continue, we introduce the following
new subadditivity inequality for the squashed entangle-
ment:
Lemma 2: For any five-party pure state ψAB1E1B2E2 ,
Esq(A;B1B2)ψ ≤ Esq(AB2E2;B1)ψ +Esq(AB1E1;B2)ψ.
Proof: See the Supplementary Note 1 for a proof.
With this new inequality in hand, we can establish the
following chain of inequalities:
Esq(A;B)ω ≤ Esq(A;B1 · · ·Bn)σ(n)
≤ Esq(AB1E1 · · ·Bn−1En−1R(n);Bn)σ(n)
+ Esq(ABnEn;B1 · · ·Bn−1)σ(n)
≤ Esq(N ) + Esq(ABnEn;B1 · · ·Bn−1)σ(n)
= Esq(N ) + Esq(AAn;B1 · · ·Bn−1)ρ(n)
≤ nEsq(N ).
The first inequality follows from monotonicity of the
squashed entanglement under LOCC. The second in-
equality is an application of the subadditivity inequal-
ity in Lemma 2. The third inequality follows because
Esq(AB1E1 · · ·Bn−1En−1R(n);Bn)σ(n) ≤ Esq(N ) (there
is a particular input to the nth channel, while the sys-
tems AB1E1 · · ·Bn−1En−1R(n) purify the system being
input to the channel). The sole equality follows because
the squashed entanglement is invariant under local isome-
tries (the isometry here being the isometric extension of
the channel). The last inequality follows by induction,
i.e., repeating this procedure by using secrecy monotonic-
ity and subadditivity, “peeling off” one term at a time.
Putting everything together, we arrive at
nR ≤ nEsq(N ) + nf(ε),
which we can divide by n and take the limit as ε→ 0 to
recover the result that P2(N ) ≤ Esq(N ). This completes
the proof of Theorem 1.
It should be stressed that the right hand of (4) is a
‘single-letter’ expression, meaning that the expression is a
function of a single channel use. This is in spite of the fact
that the quantity serves as an upper bound on the secret
key agreement capacity, which involves using the channel
many independent times, entangled input states, and/or
measurements over many channel outputs. Lemma 2
is critical for establishing the ‘single-letterization.’ The
simple expression in (4) allows us to apply the bound to
various channels, including the optical channel as shown
below.
Also, as mentioned in the introduction, Theorem 1
states that Esq(N ) is a weak converse upper bound which
bounds the key rate in the asymptotic limit of many chan-
nel uses. However, our bound is also valid for any finite
number of channel uses, in the sense that the key rate
is upper bounded in terms of Esq(N ) and the reliability
and security of the protocol. It might be possible to im-
prove upon our upper bound, by establishing a so-called
strong converse theorem (see, e.g., [32, 33]) or a refined
second-order analysis, along the lines of [34], which is left
as an important open question. We point the reader to
the Methods section for a quantitative discussion and an
example scenario involving a pure-loss optical channel.
A variation of this setting is one in which there is a for-
ward quantum channel N from Alice to Bob and a back-
ward quantum channel M from Bob to Alice. The most
general protocol for generating a shared secret will have
Alice and Bob each prepare a state on n systems, Alice
sending one system through the forward channel, them
conducting a round of LOPC, Bob sending one of his sys-
tems through the backward channel, them conducting a
round of LOPC, etc. Using essentially the same proof
technique as above, it follows that Esq(N ) + Esq(M)
serves as an upper bound on the total rate at which Al-
ice and Bob can generate a shared secret key using these
two channels many independent times. It is also worth
noting that Esq(N ) is an upper bound on the two-way as-
sisted quantum capacity Q2(N ) (defined in [35]) because
P2(N ) ≥ Q2(N ) holds in general.
Pure-loss optical channel. Now we are in a posi-
tion to derive a limit on the key generation rate of any
QKD protocol which uses a lossy optical channel. The
following input-output relation models linear loss in the
propagation of an optical mode, such as through a lossy
fiber or free space:
bˆ =
√
η aˆ+
√
1− η eˆ,
where aˆ, bˆ, and eˆ are bosonic mode operators correspond-
ing to the sender Alice’s input, the receiver Bob’s output,
and the environmental input, respectively. For the pure-
loss bosonic channel, the environment mode is in its vac-
uum state. The transmittance of the channel, η ∈ [0, 1]
is the fraction of input photons that makes it to the out-
put on average. Let Nη denote the channel from Alice
to Bob. For a secret-key agreement protocol assisted by
two-way classical-communication over this channel, we
assume that it begins and ends with finite-dimensional
states, but the processing between the first and final step
can be conducted with infinite-dimensional systems (see
the Methods section for further discussion of this point).
Furthermore, as is common in bosonic channel analy-
ses [36], we begin by imposing a mean input power con-
straint. That is, for each input mode, we require that〈
aˆ†aˆ
〉 ≤ NS, with 0 ≤ NS < ∞. Thus, Esq(Nη), with
the additional photon number constraint on the chan-
nel input is an upper bound on P2(Nη). By taking the
squashing channel for the environment Eve to be another
pure-loss bosonic channel of transmittance η1 ∈ [0, 1]
(see Fig. 2), noting that the resulting conditional mu-
tual information can be written as a sum of two condi-
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FIG. 2: Setup for calculating the upper bound on the
secret key rate of the pure-loss optical channel
.
tional entropies, and applying the extremality of Gaus-
sian states with respect to conditional entropies [3, 4], we
find that the following quantity serves as an upper bound
on Esq(Nη) for all η1 ∈ [0, 1] (see Supplementary Note 2
for a detailed proof):
1
2
[
g((1− η1 + ηη1)NS) + g((η1 + η(1− η1))NS)
− g(η1(1− η)NS)− g((1− η1)(1− η)NS)
]
, (6)
where g(x) ≡ (x+ 1) log2(x+ 1) − x log2 x is the Shan-
non entropy of a geometric distribution with mean x.
The function g(x) is also equal to the von Neumann en-
tropy of a zero-mean circularly-symmetric thermal state
with mean photon number x. Since the function in (6)
is symmetric and convex in η1, its minimum occurs at
η1 = 1/2, leading to the following simpler upper bound:
g((1 + η)NS/2)− g((1− η)NS/2).
By taking the limit of this upper bound as NS →∞, we
obtain the photon-number independent expression,
log2((1 + η)/(1− η)),
which recovers the upper bound stated in (1).
As mentioned in the introduction, any excess noise in
the channel can only reduce the squashed entanglement
of a quantum channel and thus (1) serves as a funda-
mental upper limit on the secret key agreement capacity
of a lossy optical channel. This statement follows from
a quantum data processing argument, i.e., the quantum
conditional mutual information does not increase under
processing (including noise additions) of one of the sys-
tems that is not the conditioning system (see Proposition
3 of [2]). Note that the statement does not prohibit the
improvement of the key rates by applying ‘noisy process-
ing’ in specific existing QKD protocols such as BB84 as
proposed in [39, 40]. However, such an improved key rate
is always equal or lower than our bound in (1).
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FIG. 3: Upper and lower bounds on P2 for a pure-loss
bosonic channel. The magenta solid curve is the squashed
entanglement upper bound in (1). The blue solid curve is the
reverse coherent information lower bound. The black solid
curve is the efficient BB84 protocol with perfect devices and
single photons, and the gray dotted curve is the decoy BB84
protocol including experimental imperfections [5]. The or-
ange solid curve is the Gaussian modulated coherent state
continuous variable protocol (CV-GG02) [9] with perfect de-
vices. The brown dashed and pink dash-dotted curves are
the CV-GG02 protocol including experimental imperfections
with the uncalibrated- and calibrated-device scenarios, re-
spectively. The details of the protocols and device parameters
are described in the Methods section.
Discussion
It is instructive to compare our upper bound to the
known lower bounds on the secret-key agreement capac-
ity of optical QKD protocols. BB84 is the most widely
examined QKD protocol. When operating under polar-
ization encoding and ideal conditions over a lossy chan-
nel (perfect single photon sources and detectors, and with
the efficient BB84 protocol as proposed in [41]), and with
no excess noise (i.e., Eve can do only passive attacks con-
sistent with the channel loss alone), the key rate is simply
given by η/2 secret key bits per mode [5, 41]. The best
known lower bound on the secret-key agreement capacity
of the pure-loss channel Nη was established in Ref. [42]:
P2(Nη) ≥ log2(1/(1− η)) key bits per mode. (7)
These lower bounds and our upper bound are compared
in Fig. 3, where we also plot the rate achievable with
coherent-state continuous variable protocol (CV-GG02)
[5, 9], another major protocol, without any excess noise
or imperfections. Also, as examples of the practical per-
formance of QKD, we plot the decoy-state BB84 proto-
col including device imperfections as well as the imper-
fect CV-GG02 with uncalibrated- and calibrated-device
scenarios (see the Methods section for the details of the
protocols and parameters).
We note the following important observations. First,
the two bounds in (1) and (7) become close for η  1
(the high-loss regime, relevant for long-distance QKD).
6Thus, for small η, our upper bound demonstrates that
the protocol from [42] achieving the lower bound in (7)
is nearly optimal. To be precise, the upper and the lower
bounds are well approximated by 2η/ ln 2 and η/ ln 2 key
bits per mode, when η  1 (see Fig. 3). Furthermore, the
ideal BB84 rate (η key bits per mode) is worse than the
reverse coherent information lower bound, only by a con-
stant (2/ ln 2 ≈ 2.88) factor in the high-loss regime where
the factor 2 reflects the fact that the BB84 uses two polar-
ization (or other) modes to send one bit and ln 2 reflects
some kind of gap between the qubit and continuous vari-
able protocols. On the other hand, the protocol described
in [42] that attains the reverse coherent information rate,
requires an ideal SPDC source, and collective quantum
operations and measurements, structured realizations of
which are not known. In addition, even with detector
impairments, both the decoy-state BB84 as well as the
CV-GG02 protocol (with or without the assumption of
calibrated devices) can achieve secret key rates that scale
linearly with the channel transmittance, until a maxi-
mum channel loss threshold where the rate plummets to
zero. For BB84, this loss value where the rate-cliff occurs
is driven by the detector dark counts, whereas for CV-
GG02, it is driven primarily by the electronic noise in
Bob’s homodyne detector. Hence, given the comparisons
shown in Fig. 3, and since BB84 and CV protocols are
realizable with currently available resources, it does not
seem very worthwhile to pursue alternative repeater-less
QKD protocols for higher key generation rate over a lossy
channel.
Second, our bound significantly advances one of the
long-standing open problems in quantum information
theory, that of finding a good upper bound on P2(N ), as
well as for the two-way assisted quantum capacity Q2(N )
(number of qubits that can be sent perfectly per use of a
quantum channel with two-way classical-communication
assistance). This is true for a general quantum chan-
nel N , and in particular for optical quantum channels
such as Nη. One of the important open questions is
whether or not the true P2(Nη) is additive. In other
words, the question is whether the protocol that attains
P2(Nη) requires an input state that is entangled over sev-
eral channel uses, or if a product input state suffices. In
general, it is likely that P2(N ) is super-additive for some
channel as is the case for the unassisted secret-key agree-
ment capacity P (N ) [43] and the classical capacity of
quantum channels [44]. On the other hand, it is known
that the classical capacity and the unassisted quantum
capacity of the lossy optical (bosonic) channel are ad-
ditive [36, 45]. As mentioned above, our upper bound
on P2(N ) is a single-letter expression for any channel,
i.e., the input optimization to evaluate our upper bound
needs to be performed over a single channel use. The
lower bound (7) is the single-letter reverse coherent in-
formation evaluated for the lossy bosonic channel, whose
operational interpretation is an entanglement distribu-
tion rate achievable via a product input realizable using
a two-mode squeezed vacuum state, and collective quan-
tum operations in the subsequent steps of the protocol,
which uses classical feedback [14]. Thus, despite the fact
that the additivity question for P2(Nη) remains open,
any super-additive gain cannot be very large in the high
loss regime, and P2(Nη) must scale as ∼ η, when η  1.
As a final point, consider a two-way QKD proto-
col, i.e., when Alice and Bob may use the lossy opti-
cal channel Nη in both directions, and also communicate
freely over a two-way public channel. In such a case,
the secret-key agreement capacity is upper bounded by
2 log2((1 + η)/(1− η)) secret key bits per mode transmit-
ted in both directions.
In summary, we have established in (1) an upper bound
on the rate at which any QKD protocol can generate a
shared secret key over a point-to-point lossy optical chan-
nel. This upper bound is a function of the channel loss
only, and it does not increase with increasing transmit
power. We compared our upper bound with the best
known lower bound on the key rate and a key rate at-
tainable in principle by the BB84 and CV-GG02 proto-
cols under ideal operating conditions. This comparison
reveals that there is essentially no scaling gap between
the rates of known protocols and the ultimate secret-key
agreement capacity, and thereby that there is no escaping
the fundamental exponential decay of key rate with dis-
tance. The result of this paper on the one hand provides
a powerful new tool for upper bounding the private ca-
pacity with two-way classical communication assistance,
for a general quantum channel. On the other hand, the
application to QKD over optical channels strongly sug-
gests the need for quantum repeaters to perform QKD
at high rates over long distances, no matter which actual
QKD protocol one may choose to use.
Some important open questions remain. Although our
bound applies for any finite number of channel uses, one
might be able to improve upon our result by establishing
a strong converse theorem or even better by consider-
ing a second-order analysis, along the lines discussed in
[34]. For establishing a strong converse theorem, some
combination of the ideas presented in [46, 47] might be
helpful. Another important open question is whether our
upper bound in (1) could be achievable using some QKD
protocol, or whether the bound can be further tightened
by choosing a squashing channel for Eve other than the
pure-loss channel (as shown in Fig. 2) or by investigating
upper bounds other than Esq(N ). For this last question,
some recent results in classical information theory [48, 49]
might be helpful.
Methods
Weak converse and the key rate upper bound
for a finite number of channel uses. Although our
7main result establishes only a weak converse theorem,
it is possible to estimate the effect of a finite number
of channel uses, which is always the case in any practical
setting. We carefully estimate f(ε) discussed in the proof
of Theorem 1. From the continuity inequality in (5), we
can explicitly describe the additional term f(ε):
nR ≤ nEsq(N ) + 16
√
ε log d+ 4h2
(
2
√
ε
)
,
where d = 2nR. This implies the following bound:
R ≤ 1
1− 16√ε
(
Esq(N ) + 4h2
(
2
√
ε
)
/n
)
.
In the limit of large n, the second term 4h2(2
√
ε)/n van-
ishes and the upper bound becomes
R ≤ 1
1− 16√ε (Esq(N )),
which suggests that there might be room for a trade-
off between communication rate and error probabil-
ity/security as quantified by ε. If one could establish
a strong converse theorem, this would eliminate the im-
plied trade-off given above, in the ideal case showing that
the bound R ≤ Esq(N ) would hold in the large n limit
regardless of the value of ε.
Let us consider a quantitative example, consisting of
a pure-loss channel with ε = 10−10 and n = 104 (these
are not too far from realistic QKD parameters [4]). For
these values, we get
1/(1− 16√ε) ≈ 1.0002, (8)
4h2
(
2
√
ε
)
/n ≈ 1.36× 10−7. (9)
Furthermore, a 200km fiber with 0.2dBkm−1 corresponds
to η = 10−4 and log((1 + η)/(1 − η)) ≈ 2.885 × 10−4.
Replacing Esq(N ) with our upper bound log((1+η)/(1−
η)) (see (1)) and plugging in the above values of ε and n,
we find that
R ≤ 2.887× 10−4,
which is rather close to log((1 + η)/(1 − η)) ≈ 2.885 ×
10−4. However, one can improve upon our upper bound
by establishing a strong converse theorem or even better
by providing a refined second-order analysis along the
lines discussed in [34].
Infinite-dimensional system. An optical channel
can transmit infinite-dimensional (i.e., continuous vari-
able) quantum states while Theorem 1 implicitly assumes
finite-dimensional systems. We can circumvent this sub-
tlety by assuming the protocol between Alice and Bob be-
gins and ends with finite-dimensional states, but the pro-
cessing between the first and final step can be conducted
with infinite-dimensional systems. That is, their objec-
tive is to generate a maximally entangled state |Φ〉AB
or a finite number of secret key bits, and they do so by
Alice encoding a finite-dimensional quantum state into
an infinite-dimensional system and the final step of the
protocol has them truncate their systems to be of finite
dimension. In this way, the continuity inequality in the
proof of Theorem 1 safely applies and all of the other
steps in between involve only the quantum data process-
ing inequality, which has been proven to hold in the gen-
eral infinite-dimensional setting [50].
Decoy state BB84 and CV-GG02 protocols with
experimental imperfections. The asymptotic secret
key rates of the decoy state BB84 protocol and the CV-
GG02 in Fig. 3 are calculated from the theoretical models
including imperfections summarized in [5]. The param-
eters used for the plots are as follows: For the decoy
BB84, the visibility of interference at Bob’s receiver is
0.99, the transmittance of Bob’s device is unity, the de-
tector efficiency is 0.2, dark count rate is 10−6, and the
information leakage parameter due to the practical er-
ror code is set to be 1.2. For the CV-GG02 protocol,
the optical noise is 0.005, the detector efficiency is 0.5,
the electronic noise of the detector is 0.01, and the effi-
ciency of the error correction code is set to be 0.9. These
parameters are chosen to reflect the state of the art de-
vice technologies. In the ‘uncalibrated-device’ scenario,
Eve is able to access Bob’s homodyne detector imper-
fections, e.g. to entangle the loss and noise of the de-
tector. The ‘calibrated-device’ scenario is based on the
assumption that the homodyne detector is calibrated in
a secure laboratory such that Eve cannot entangle her
system to the detector imperfections. This assumption
allows Alice and Bob to significantly extend the key rate
and the loss tolerance. Note that the purpose of these
plots is to compare these protocols under imperfections
with our fundamental upper bound but is not to com-
pare the practical aspects between these protocols (for
example, our model does not include important practical
conditions such as phase stability, repetition rate of the
system, actual coding strategies, etc). For completeness,
the key rate formulae for each protocol and scenario are
described in Supplementary Note 3.
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SUPPLEMENTARY NOTE 1: PROOF OF THE SUBADDITIVITY INEQUALITY (LEMMA 2)
Let us restate the statement of the lemma: For any five-party pure state ψAB1E1B2E2 , the following subadditivity
inequality holds
Esq(A;B1B2)ψ ≤ Esq(AB2E2;B1)ψ + Esq(AB1E1;B2)ψ.
Proof. Let
τAB1E′1B2E2 ≡ SE1→E′1(ψAB1E1B2E2),
σAB1E1B2E′2 ≡ SE2→E′2(ψAB1E1B2E2),
ωAB1E′1B2E′2 ≡ (SE1→E′1 ⊗ SE2→E′2)(ψAB1E1B2E2),
where each SEi→E′i is an arbitrary local squashing channel. Let |φω〉AB1E′1B2E′2R be a purification of ω with purifying
system R. The inequality in Lemma 2 is a consequence of the following chain of inequalities:
2Esq(A;B1B2)ψ ≤ I(A;B1B2|E′1E′2)ω
= H(B1B2|E′1E′2)ω −H(B1B2|E′1E′2A)ω
= H(B1B2|E′1E′2)φ +H(B1B2|R)φ
≤ H(B1|E′1)φ +H(B2|E′2)φ
+H(B1|R)φ +H(B2|R)φ
= H(B1|E′1)ω −H(B1|AB2E′1E′2)ω
+H(B2|E′2)ω −H(B2|AB1E′1E′2)ω
= I(AB2E
′
2;B1|E′1)ω + I(AB1E′1;B2|E′2)ω
≤ I(AB2E2;B1|E′1)τ + I(AB1E1;B2|E′2)σ.
The first inequality follows from the definition in (2). The first equality is a rewriting of the conditional mutual
information. The second equality exploits duality of conditional entropy: for any pure tripartite state on systems
KLM , the equality H(K|L) +H(K|M) = 0 holds. The second inequality results from several applications of strong
subadditivity (SSA) of quantum entropy (SSA is the statement that I(K;L|M) ≥ 0 for an arbitrary state on systems
KLM) [1]. The third equality again exploits duality of conditional entropy and the last equality is just a rewriting in
terms of conditional mutual informations. The final inequality is a result of a quantum data processing inequality for
conditional mutual information (see the proof of Proposition 3 of [2]). Since the calculation above is independent of
the choice of the maps SEi→E′i , the system E1 purifies the state on AB1B2E2, and the system E2 purifies the state
on AB1B2E1, the subadditivity inequality in the statement of the theorem follows.
SUPPLEMENTARY NOTE 2: SQUASHED ENTANGLEMENT UPPER BOUND FOR THE PURE-LOSS
BOSONIC CHANNEL
Here we detail a proof that (5) is an upper bound on P2(Nη), where Nη is a pure-loss bosonic channel with
transmittance η ∈ [0, 1].
As mentioned before, we need to consider only pure states |φ〉AA′ when optimizing the squashed entanglement of
a quantum channel. Let USE→E′F be an isometric extension of Eve’s squashing channel SE→E′ . Let |ψ〉ABE′F ≡
USE→E′FU
N
A′→BE |φ〉AA′ , so that, TrF [|φ〉〈φ|ABE′F ] = SE→E′ ◦ UNA′→BE(φAA′). Then
sup
φAA′
Esq(A;B)NA′→B(φAA′ )
= sup
φAA′
1
2
inf
SE→E′
I(A;B|E′)
= sup
φAA′
1
2
inf
SE→E′
(H(B|E′)ψ −H(B|AE′)ψ)
= sup
φAA′
1
2
inf
SE→E′
(H(B|E′)ψ +H(B|F )ψ). (10)
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The first equality follows from the definition of the squashed entanglement. The second equality follows from the
definition of conditional quantum mutual information. The third equality uses the duality of conditional entropy and
the fact that |ψ〉 is pure.
Now suppose that Alice and Bob are connected by a pure-loss bosonic channel with transmittance η. It is not
necessarily an easy task to optimize Eve’s squashing channel S. Instead, we consider a specific squashing channel: a
pure-loss bosonic channel Lη1 with transmittance η1. As shown above, the squashed entanglement can be written as a
sum of two conditional entropies, each of which is a function of the reduced state TrA{φAA′} on A′. Since the overall
channel from A′ to BE′ is Gaussian and the overall channel from A′ to BF is Gaussian and due to the photon-number
constraint at the input, it follows from the extremality of Gaussian states for conditional entropy [3, 4] that a thermal
state on A′ of mean photon number NS maximizes both of these quantities. With this and the fact that φAA′ is a
pure state, we can conclude that the optimal φAA′ is a two-mode squeezed vacuum (TMSV) state. Let NS be the
average photon number of one share of the TMSV. Then the covariance matrix of the reduced thermal state at A′ is
given by
γA
′
=
[
1 + 2NS 0
0 1 + 2NS
]
.
Note that the covariance matrix is defined such that a vacuum state (or coherent state) is described by an identity
matrix. Therefore a covariance matrix of the initial state in system A′E′F is given by γA
′⊕IE′⊕IF . The beamsplitting
operations are given by the transformation
γA
′ ⊕ IE′ ⊕ IF → Sη1Sη
(
γA
′ ⊕ IE′ ⊕ IF
)
STη S
T
η1 ,
where
Sη =
 √η √1− η 0−√1− η √η 0
0 0 1
⊕2, Sη1 =
 1 0 00 √η1 √1− η1
0 −√1− η1 √η1
⊕2,
(the superscript “⊕2” means that the same matrix is applied to both x and p quadratures. Because of the symmetry
of the state and the beamsplitter operation in phase space, basically we need to consider only one quadrature.) This
transformation is easily calculated and we get a covariance matrix for the state TrA{|φ〉〈φ|ABE′F }:
Sη1Sη
(
γA
′ ⊕ IE′ ⊕ IF
)
STη1S
T
η =
 1 + η2NS −
√
η(1− η)√η12NS
√
η(1− η)√1− η12NS
−√η(1− η)√η12NS 1 + (1− η)η12NS −(1− η)√η1(1− η1)2NS√
η(1− η)√1− η12NS −(1− η)
√
η1(1− η1)2NS 1 + (1− η)(1− η1)2NS
⊕2.
It immediately implies a covariance matrix of the marginal state on E′:
γE′ =
[
1 + (1− η)η12NS 0
0 1 + (1− η)η12NS
]
,
which is the covariance matrix for a thermal state with photon number (1− η)η1NS. Thus we have
H(E′) = g((1− η)η1NS),
where g(x) = (1 + x) log(1 + x)− x log x. Similarly, we get
H(F ) = g((1− η)(1− η1)NS).
The other entropies H(BE′) and H(BF ) are also obtained by considering the corresponding submatrices and diago-
nalizing them. Then we can find
H(BE′) = g({η + (1− η)η1}NS)
H(BF ) = g({η + (1− η)(1− η1)}NS) (11)
As a consequence, we obtain the upper bound,
P2(Nη) ≤ min
η1
1
2
{
g({η + (1− η)η1}NS)− g((1− η)η1NS) + g({η + (1− η)(1− η1)}NS)− g((1− η)(1− η1)NS)
}
= g((1 + η)NS/2)− g((1− η)NS/2). (12)
The minimal value is achieved by η1 = 1/2 because the function is symmetric and convex in η1 (with convexity checked
by computing the second derivative). The expression g((1 + η)NS/2)−g((1− η)NS/2) converges to log(1 +η)/(1−η)
as NS →∞.
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SUPPLEMENTARY NOTE 3: SECRET KEY RATES FOR THE DECOY BB84 AND CV-GG02
PROTOCOLS
In this supplementary note, we describe the asymptotic key rate formulae for the decoy BB84 and Gaussian
modulated coherent-state CV-GG02 protocols. Detailed description of the protocols and the derivation of their key
rates are for example found in [5] and references therein. Note that we only consider the asymptotic limit, that is,
the channel estimation is perfectly done by negligibly small amount of pulses.
Decoy BB84 protocol. Let ξ be the mean photon number of the pulse which is tunable to generate decoy states.
For each ξ, the key rate is given by
Kξ = Rξ
{
Y ξ0 + Y
ξ
1 (1− h(1)− leakEC(Qξ)
}
. (13)
We can assume that a given value µ is almost always used for ξ. Thus in the following we only consider ξ = µ and then
optimize µ to maximize the key rate in Eq. (13). The parameters in the rhs of Eq. (13) are as follows: R is the total
detection rate (here it is given by the rate per mode per pulse. Note that the deocy BB84 usually uses two modes,
such as polarization or time bins, to send one bit of quantum information), Yn = Rn/R where Rn is the detection
rate for the events when Alice sent n photons (
∑
nRn = R and thus
∑
n Yn = 1), n is the error rate on the n photon
signal, h(·) is the binary entropy function, Q is the quantum bit error rate (QBER), and leakEC(Qξ) = fh(Q) and
f ≥ 1 represents the efficiency of the error correction code. For the decoy BB84 protocol, these terms are given by
Rµ =
(
1− e−µt(1− 2pd)
)
(1− pd)/2, (14)
Y µ0 =
2pde
−µ
1− e−µt + 2pde−µt , (15)
Y µ1 =
µe−µ(t(1− pd) + 2(1− t)pd)
1− (1− 2pd)e−µt , (16)
1 =
t+ (1− t)pd
t+ 2(1− t)pd (17)
Qµ =
− (− pd)e−µt
1− (1− 2pd)e−µt (18)
where t = ηηBηd, η is the channel transmittance, ηB is the efficiency of Bob’s devices, ηd is the efficiency of Bob’s
detectors. pd is the dark counts of the detector, and  = (1−V )/2 with the visibility V . The optimal key rate is then
given by
Kdecoyopt = max
µ
Kµ. (19)
CV-GG02 protocol. The key rate is given by
K = R[βI(A;B)− χ(B;E)], (20)
where R is the repetition rate, which is omitted in our calculation, β is the reconciliation efficiency, I(A;B) is the
mutual information between Alice and Bob, and χ(B;E) is the Holevo information between Bob and Eve. In the
following we consider the uncalibrated- and calibrated-device scenarios. For both scenarios, I(A;B) has the same
expression:
I(A;B) =
1
2
log2
δ + v
δ + 1
, (21)
where v = vA + 1 is the variance of the Alice’s output thermal state and vA is the variance of the Alice’s Gaussian
modulation. δ is the total noise between Alice and Bob:
δ = δch + δh/η, (22)
where δch = (1 − η)/η +  is the channel noise with the channel tarnsmittance η and the optical excess noise , and
δh = (1 + vel)/ηd − 1 is the noise of the Bob’s homodyne detector with the homodyne detector’s electronic noise vel
and quantum efficiency ηd.
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The amount of the Holevo information depends on the scenario. For the uncalibrated-device scenario, Eve can hold
a whole environmental part including the loss and noise of the homodyne detector at Bob’s side. Then the Holevo
information is calculated to be [5]
χuc(B;E) = g(λ˜1) + g(λ˜2)− g(λ˜3), (23)
where λ˜k = (λk − 1)/2,
λ21,2 =
1
2
(
A±
√
A2 − 4B
)
, (24)
λ23 =
v(1 + vδ)
v + δ
, (25)
and
A = v2(1− 2ηηd) + 2ηηd + {ηηd(v + δ)}2, (26)
B = {ηηd(vδ + 1)}2. (27)
The achievable key rate is then obtained by maximizing K over v ≥ 1.
For the calibrated-device scenario, Eve cannot access to the homodyne detector’s imperfections. The Holevo
information for such a scenario is for example given in [6]. We summarize it here for the completeness:
χc(B;E) = g(λ˜
′
1) + g(λ˜
′
2)− g(λ˜′3)− g(λ˜′4), (28)
where λ˜′k = (λ
′
k − 1)/2,
λ′21,2 =
1
2
(
A′ ±
√
A′2 − 4B′
)
, (29)
λ′23,4 =
1
2
(
C ′ ±
√
C ′2 − 4D′
)
, (30)
and
A′ = v2(1− 2η) + 2η + {η(v + δch)}2, (31)
B′ = {η(vδch + 1)}2, (32)
C ′ =
v
√
B′ + η(v + δch) +A′δh
η(v + δ)
, (33)
D′ =
v
√
B′ +B′δh
η(v + δ)
, (34)
The achievable key rate is again obtained by maximizing K over v ≥ 1.
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